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Moya Lloyd 
Emotion and affect clearly play a role in politics.1 For many contemporary political 
theorists, particularly liberal and deliberative types, they actively hamper it. As 
Michael Walzer puts it, where ‘[i]nterests can be negotiated, principles can be 
debated, and negotiations and debates are political processes’, containing the 
behaviour of those involved in politics, ‘passion, on this view, knows no limits, [it] 
sweeps all before it’. It is ‘impetuous, unmediated, all-or-nothing’ (Walzer 2004: 110-
11). It leads (ostensibly) to violence, conflict and war.  
Refreshingly, William Connolly offers a different take on the connections between 
emotion and political values, judgments and actions (see also Krause, 2006). 
Specifically, his aim is to demonstrate how affect-imbued ideas (might) help to 
nurture the ethos of generosity he is seeking to affirm. He is thus concerned with how 
emotion and affect actively contribute towards the development of a particular 
normative project, rather than hindering it. As will become clear, Connolly’s point is 
not, however, that affectivity and emotion serve simply as auxiliaries to a rationally 
derived ethos, the ‘glue’ binding us to our political values and judgements. They are, 
rather, constitutive elements in the generation, nurturance and consolidation of that 
very ethos.2  
Just as Connolly claims to think both with and against Nietzsche in articulating his 
own theory, so in this chapter my goal is to think both with and against Connolly in 
examining the relation between politics and affect.3 Thinking with Connolly, I will 
deploy several of his insights into the layering of culture, the brain/body/culture 
network, the relation between ideationality and affect, and the link between 
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micropolitics and techniques of the self. Thinking against him, however, I use these 
insights not to understand how a democratic ethos might be cultivated (which is 
Connolly’s goal) but to understand how it might be hampered through the production 
of certain bodies as worthless or hateful. My interest, therefore, is in the conditions of 
possibility underpinning Connolly’s pluralist project and, in particular, the opposition 
he establishes between resentment and (the ethos of) generosity, an opposition I 
seek to trouble. For if, as Connolly surmises, generosity is the necessary condition 
for the generation of a democratic ethos, then what happens to those bodies and 
subjects for whom such generosity is difficult, if not impossible? Do they cease to be 
democratic subjects? In response, I will suggest, that rather than generosity being a 
precondition of democratic engagement for such persons, it may be precisely 
resentment that enables them to act, resentment at being, what Judith Butler calls, 
‘unintelligible’ (2004a, 2004b; see also Lloyd 2007, Ch. 6).4 In short, I seek to worry 
away at the link between ethics and democracy implied by Connolly’s work. 
Against Connolly I will contend, therefore, that the relation between generosity and 
resentment is more ambivalent, unpredictable and multifaceted – more undecidable, 
in Derridean terms – than he generally allows. To illustrate my argument, I explore 
the work of African American feminist author and activist Audre Lorde. I focus here 
on the role of affect in the process of cultural corporealization and on the racializing 
norms that constitute both the body politic and the fleshy bodies that populate it. To 
begin with, however, I offer a brief exegesis of Connolly’s argument in Neuropolitics, 
the text I concentrate on in this chapter. 
Affect-imbued thinking made flesh  
Neuropolitics is an impressive and wide-ranging work. In it, Connolly explores the 
role of neuroscience, cinematic technique and philosophy, amongst other things, in 
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understanding the relations between the brain, body and culture, and their role in the 
cultivation of an ethos of generosity. By blending together insights drawn from all 
three realms, Connolly is able to articulate an account of thinking that is distinct, in 
his own words, ‘from the Kantian model of command through the Habermasian 
model of deliberative ethics and the Rawlsian model of justice, to the Taylorite model 
of attunement to a higher purpose in being’ (2002a: 85). What these accounts share 
is an understanding of thinking as a rational process. By contrast, what Connolly 
proposes is that thinking should be apprehended as both cognitive and affective. Not 
only that, but it ought also to be recognised as both somatic and culturally variable. 
(Indeed, as he writes elsewhere, the body is ‘simultaneously the text upon which the 
script of society is written and the fugitive sources from which spring desires, 
resistances and thought exceeding that script’ (1995: 12).) As noted above, to make 
his case he draws on a range of different disciplines.  
From neuroscientific studies of brain/body processes, Connolly takes the idea that 
thinking has a layered character, where culture is mixed with affect, nature with 
judgment, and where pre-cognitive memory traces and somatic habits are folded into 
perception. In short, mind and body are ‘intrinsically connected’ (Connolly 2006: 72).  
Studying film allows for confirmation of this interconnectivity. Cinematic techniques, 
such as flashbacks, non-linear chronology, dream sequences in vivid colours or the 
use of dissonant sounds, ‘communicate affective energies to us’ (2002a: 13) that 
alter our bodies, structure our perceptions and impact on us in a number of ways 
before rational or conscious processing kicks in. This, Connolly concludes, exposes 
‘the complex relays [that exist] among affect, thinking, techniques and ethics’. 
Potentially, film can also ‘teach us how to apply pertinent techniques to ourselves’ 
(Connolly 2002a: 2). Finally, Connolly turns to philosophy, and specifically the 
philosophy of Spinoza.  
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It is Spinoza’s idea that mind and body are ‘two aspects’ (viz., thought and extension) 
of the same substance that Connolly fixes on (Connolly 2002a: 7; see Spinoza 1955: 
86). For it suggests that because mind and reason are so indelibly tied to materiality 
and affect that ‘each change of the body is matched by a parallel change of mind 
(and vice versa), even though neither body nor mind can be understood through the 
concepts appropriate to the other’ (Connolly 2006: 68). The implication of this for 
ethics and politics is clear to Connolly: concentrating on expanding the opportunities 
for rational deliberation will never be enough. It is also necessary to engage affective 
and corporeal capacities because they too can change habitual patterns of thought 
and of (political and ethical) judgement (2006: 68).5 ‘Sometimes’, he writes in 
‘Confessing Identity/Belonging to Difference’ (the introductory essay produced for the 
2002 edition of his 1991 book Identity/Difference), ‘it is wise to work tactically on the 
visceral register of identity, on thought-imbued feelings of attachment, faith, disgust, 
shame, ambivalence, love or disdain that influence action and judgment but fall 
below direct intellectual regulation’ (2002b, xviii) because what happens in the 
visceral register impacts on the cognitive.  
To work on an established sensibility by tactical means, then, is to nudge the 
composition of some layers in relation to others... You do so to encourage the 
effects of action upon one register to filter into the experience and imagination 
available on others, thereby working tactically upon a dense sensibility whose 
layered composition is partly receptive to direct argument and deliberation, partly 
receptive to tactics that extend beyond the reach of argument, and partly resistant 
to both (Connolly 2002a: 107).    
Connolly is distinct from other contemporary theorists. He is not interested in thought 
or speech per se. His focus is ‘the sensibilities and intensities that inform the 
communicative material for thought’ (Williams, 2007: 351) and the role these play in 
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ethical and political engagement. Or, rather, the role they play in nurturing an ethos 
of generosity.  
Central to Connolly’s discussion are the two terms that interest me in this chapter, 
that is, resentment and generosity; terms that he sets in opposition to one another. 
His affirmative project involves the articulation of an ethos suited to a context of deep 
pluralism; a democratic ethos open to difference. In Identity/Difference, he examines 
how identities may become entrenched and how because identities are formed in 
relation to difference there is always the possibility that those differences will be 
denigrated, marginalised, and/or excluded. In cases like these, difference is 
converted into otherness. This is most likely to happen when tendencies to 
fundamentalization reign (Connolly 1995: xxi). What is to be done?  
According to Connolly, a way needs to be found increasingly blend presumptive 
generosity for the ‘plurivocity of being’ (2002b: xx) into ethical and political life. To 
nourish generosity (towards difference), he argues that existential resentment must 
be starved. For it is existential resentment, as he sees it, that leads us to treat those 
from whom we differ as a threat both to us and to our way of life; as requiring – 
perhaps, deserving – suppression, conquest, or elimination; as being unworthy of our 
friendship, assistance, sympathy or grief; and even as being to blame for all that is 
amiss in our lives (our failings, the injustices we suffer, and so on). Resentment, he 
surmises in post-Nietzschean vein, translates into a desire for revenge, a retaliatory 
orientation towards alterity, and an obdurate refusal to admit the uncanny. 
Generosity, by contrast, is sustained by ‘an attachment to the abundance of life’ 
(Connolly 2002b: xxi), by its responsiveness to that which exceeds established 
conventions, and by a capacity to embrace the new – new ‘beings, identities, and 
cultural movements [that] surge into being’ or new words and phrases that bubble up 
‘from a virtual register hard at work below the threshold of feeling and intellectual 
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attention’ (Connolly 2002a: 55, 75).6 In short, generosity is a positive resource for 
ethics and politics but resentment (expressed through negative affects) is not. So, the 
main aim of Connolly’s work is to find ways in which generosity can be nurtured – 
and, by implication, ways in which resentment can be converted into generosity.  
For Connolly, this entails a doubled practice of ethical experimentation. The first form 
of experimentation Connolly refers to (echoing Foucault) as ‘relational techniques of 
the self’: ‘the choreographed mixtures of word, gesture, image, sound, rhythm, smell, 
and touch that help to define the sensibility in which your perception, thinking, 
identity, beliefs, and judgment are set’ (Connolly 2002a: 20). The second form 
involves what he terms ‘micropolitics’, that is relational techniques ‘organized and 
deployed collectively by professional associations, mass-media talk shows, TV and 
film dramas, military training, work processes, neighbourhood gangs, church 
meetings, school assemblies, sports events, charitable organizations, commercial 
advertising, child rearing, judicial practice and police routines’, one of the ‘critical 
functions’ of which is to organize ‘attachments, consumption possibilities, work 
routines, faith practices, child rearing, education, investment, security, and 
punishment (Connolly 2002a: 20-21, my emphasis).  
Arts of the self and micropolitics are not entirely distinct. They are rather ‘two sides of 
the same coin’ (Connolly 1999: 148), operating ‘“in-between”’ – in between subliminal 
attachments and consciously-held beliefs; emerging groups demanding rights and 
existing groups resisting them; and one set of ideals and another. Techniques feed 
into micropolitics and micropolitics impacts on techniques. Cultivating an ethos of 
generosity is not an exclusively solitary endeavour. It also necessitates what 
Connolly (paraphrasing Deleuze) calls the ‘cultural collectivization and politicization 
of arts of the self’ (2002a: 108). Work on the self is required in order to tend one’s 
ethical sensibility in relation to others. This newly tended sensibility is then brought to 
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bear on micropolitical relations, serving to reconfigure them in a more open and 
responsive direction (see also Connolly 1999: chapter 6 for a fuller discussion of the 
political implications of this ethos). There is thus a dynamic relation between the two.  
As Connolly has it, the lifeblood of a democratic politics of becoming is ‘presumptive 
generosity’ and arts of the self plus micropolitics are the means by it is folded into the 
visceral register of being and into the public ethos of political life (Connolly 2002a: 
137). This is where I want to press Connolly’s argument further from a democratic 
perspective. As he acknowledges, there is nothing in the affective or infrasensible 
dimensions of thinking per se that necessarily produces a stance of generosity 
towards the other. Indeed, the converse is entirely possible as he observes in Why I 
Am Not A Secularist, when he notes that the ‘visceral register’ may act ‘to harden 
strife between partisans’ (Connolly 1999: 3).7 The links that are formed between 
‘practices of memory, perception, thinking, judgement, institutional design, and 
political ethos’ (Connolly 2002a: 21) may well work to nurture resentment rather than 
to support a generous ethical stance. In fact, I would surmise, they might do more 
than this: they might also nourish and sustain forms of subordination through their 
recycling of norms of possibility and thence also of impossibility (see Butler 2004a: 
31). 
To illustrate what I mean by this, in the next section of this chapter, I explore how 
race hatred is produced and supported by the circulation and transfer of affect, a 
circulation and transfer that I argue constitutes certain bodies as hated and as 
hateful. My focus here is on an essay written by Audre Lorde, entitled ‘Eye to Eye: 
Black Women, Hatred, and Anger’ (1984a: 145-75), originally published in 1983. I 
have three purposes in reading Lorde’s work with and against Connolly’s: to show 
that the relation between resentment and generosity is more complex than Connolly 
assumes; to raise questions about the conditions of possibility for cultivating 
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generosity, including who might be considered culturally capable of the democratic 
work Connolly describes; and, finally, to suggest that democratic struggle also 
involves a struggle with norms, and specifically with the social and cultural norms that 
render some persons unintelligible.  
Race-hate and the construction of loathsome bodies 
As the title of Lorde’s essay suggests her topic is the anger of Black women – or, 
rather, her own anger as a Black woman. It is not her anger against the white racist 
culture that has produced her as an object of resentment that concerns her primarily, 
though she is certainly vexed by this, though this certainly underpins other essays in 
the volume from which ‘Eye to Eye’ comes. It is the anger she feels in her 
interactions with other Black women.  
In order to work on this anger, Lorde has first to attend to the suffering she continues 
to feel as a result of ‘unmetabolized pain’, as she calls it. Pain, that is, that has not 
yet been ‘recognized [or] named’ and that thus cannot be ‘transformed into 
something else’ (1984a: 171). As part of her attempt to metabolize that pain, Lorde 
works over a series of prior experiences concerning her treatment at the hands of 
white Americans. She offers six anecdotes, the first of which I will consider in this 
paper. It relates to the five year old Audre.  
The AA subway to Harlem. I clutch my mother’s sleeve, her arms full of 
shopping bags, christmas-heavy. The wet smell of winter clothes, the train’s 
lurching. My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little snowsuited body 
down. On one side of me a man reading a paper. On the other, a woman in a 
fur hat staring at me. Her mouth twitches as she stares and then her gaze 
drops down, pulling mine with it. Her leather-gloved hand plucks at the line 
where my new blue snowpants and her sleek fur coat meet. She jerks her coat 
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closer to her. I look. I do not see whatever terrible thing she is seeing on the 
seat between us – probably a roach. But she has communicated her horror to 
me. It must be something very bad from the way she’s looking, so I pull my 
snowsuit closer to me away from it, too. When I look up the woman is still 
staring at me, her nose holes and eyes huge. And suddenly I realize there is 
nothing crawling up the seat between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to 
touch. The fur brushes my face as she stands with a shudder and holds on to a 
strap in the speeding train. Born and bred a New York City child, I quickly slide 
over to make room for my mother to sit down. No word has been spoken. I’m 
afraid to say anything to my mother because I don’t know what I’ve done. I look 
at the sides of my snowpants, secretly. Is there something on them? 
Something’s going on here I do not understand, but I will never forget it. Her 
eyes. The flared nostrils. The hate (Lorde 1984a: 147-8).8  
The origin of the noun, ‘emotion’, is Latin [from è - movè - re (è - out  + movè - re to 
move)]. It is a noun of action. The Oxford English Dictionary gives one of its obsolete 
forms as ‘A moving out, migration, transference from one place to another’. What 
Lorde bears witness to in her testimony is of precisely this: of something – emotion, 
affect, it is not yet clear – moving out, migrating, transferring from the ageless fur-
coated body of the white woman to the confused, uncomprehending child. As her 
nostrils flare, mouth twitches, huge eyes stare, hand ‘jerks’ pulling her coat closer to 
her and body shudders on standing to hold the rail strap, wordlessly, the corpus of 
the woman symptomatically expresses a set of ‘thought-imbued energies’ (Connolly 
2002a: 76) that pass to the child, conveying hatred, hatred of her small black body. It 
is, as the older Audre comments, the young Audre’s flesh, her skin, that has exposed 
her to the woman’s affect-imbued gaze. It is her body – her black body – that has 
made her vulnerable to this affective transfer (Butler, 2004a: 21; 2004b: 26).  
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Affect, as Connolly observes, is contagious; it infects as it ‘flows across bodies’ 
(2002a: 75).9 This infectiousness interests me. For the affect that passes between 
the bodies of woman and child, passes not between two pre-constituted bodies, I 
propose, rather as it passes it produces one of those bodies, on Lorde’s telling, as a 
hated body, a hateful black body. The affect exhibited by the woman expresses, in 
other words, a racially freighted and culturally encoded emotion, race-hatred, that 
infects the child. Or so Lorde believes. Even though the five-year old Audre cannot 
initially ‘name’ the hatred she sees in the woman’s eyes, she sees it nevertheless.10 
Her flesh is shaped by it. The hatred corporealizes her. Furthermore, Lorde’s body, 
the ‘porous boundary’ always already given over to the other (Butler 2004b: 134-5), is 
at that moment inserted into an economy of hate where it is produced (and ultimately 
reproduced) and circulates as a pollutant, an impurity, a ‘bad’ body (as Lorde 
describes her fleshly self). It is made into a corpus that cannot be allowed to ‘touch’ 
the ‘pure’ white body of the woman seated next to her. And, of course, to guarantee 
this non-touching – indeed to negate the possibility of touch – the woman herself 
stands up. She literally moves away from the child. The space of the subway train 
becomes an affectively-imbued space, a politicized space.11 At this moment, 
difference, following Connolly we might say, is transformed into otherness, a 
denigrated, devalued otherness. 
Taken together with the five other equally distressing stories Lorde tells of her 
meetings with white Americans, we see how her fleshy body is reiteratively invested 
with emotional value, a value that performatively shapes it as a body – a repulsive 
body, a “Black” woman’s body, a body ‘steeped in hatred’ (Lorde 1984a: 146). It 
becomes a body, to borrow from Connolly, that ‘by the very visibility of its mode of 
being as other’ (2002b: 66) is produced again and again within this racialized 
economy of hate as an existential threat.12 Racist culture is thus corporealized 
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through the movement of affect between two (or more) racially marked bodies, a 
movement reinscribing that marking as it flows between them. It is this flow of affect 
at a micropolitical level, I suggest, that shores up racial resentment and bolsters 
racial hierarchies. Hatred and loathing are not independent of or separate from the 
culture of racism; they are layered into it, both its visceral products and its mainstays. 
They are one of the dispositional anchors feeding off, yet nourishing that culture, 
encoded in, to borrow from Connolly’s borrowing from Foucault, the ‘symbolic 
systems’ and ‘real practices’ that normalize, regulate and discipline the fleshy bodies 
of those performativity constituted as inferior, not-good-enough, as Black and female 
(1995: 195).  
It is where Lorde goes next in her discussion of race-hatred that is telling. She 
reveals how the hatred and contempt that circulate through the affective economy of 
racism are deeply, perniciously, contagious contaminating not just relations between 
Black women and the white Americans they meet but also the relations between 
Black women. ‘Every Black woman in America’, Lorde writes, ‘lives her life somewhat 
along a wide curve of ancient and unexpressed angers’. Since ‘[o]ther Black women 
are not the root cause nor the source of that pool of anger’, she wonders ‘why does 
that anger unleash itself most tellingly against another Black woman at the least 
excuse?’. ‘Why’, she asks, ‘do I judge her in a more critical light than any other, 
becoming enraged when she does not measure up?’ (Lorde 1984a: 145). Her 
answer, cruelly truncated for the purposes of this paper, is that her rage is an effect 
of internalizing racism’s visceral register. The hatred exhibited towards her, becomes 
a hatred she turns against herself; the body that is hated by others becomes a body 
she hates; the loathing others exhibit towards her becomes a loathing directed 
against her self. The circulation of hate – with its emotionalization of the black body 
and its corporealization of culture – does not stop there, however. It pulses though 
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the affective economy of racism ‘organizing attachments’ (Connolly 2002a: 21), 
affecting judgements and actions, (and to paraphrase Connolly [2002a: 19]) recoiling 
back on Lorde as it sets emotional barriers between not only her and white 
Americans but also between her and other Black women – her sisters, her mother, 
her daughter, her friends, anonymous Black women she encounters in libraries. 
The passage of corporealized emotion that scores Lorde’s encounter with the white 
woman on the train continues its movement on and through the social body she 
traverses marking her corporeo-emotional encounters with the Black women she 
meets there.  
For if I take the white world’s estimation of me as Black-woman-synonymous-with-
garbage to heart, then deep down inside myself I will always believe that I am truly 
good for nothing. But it is very hard to look absorbed hatred in the face. It is easier 
to see you as good for nothing because you are like me. So when you support me 
because you are like me, that merely confirms that you are nothing too, just like 
me. It’s a no-win position, a case of nothing supporting nothing and someone’s 
gonna have to pay for that one, and it sure ain’t gonna be me!’ (Lorde 1984a: 168-
9, my emphasis). 
Lorde’s struggle suggests that the ‘entanglements of identity with difference’ that 
Connolly sees, in The Ethos of Pluralization, as central to the ‘rage against 
difference’ (1995: xvii) might operate in different ways than he usually acknowledges. 
As Lorde’s essay attests it is not those whose identity differs from hers whom she 
resents, it is those with whom she shares an identity – Black women.13 The norms 
that define Lorde as other – as less-than – generate, I would suggests, the optic 
through which she views those like her. They colour her ‘visceral habits of perception’ 
(Connolly 2002a: 47), conditioning her affective response to other Black women. 14  
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So her aim in this essay is to consider ways to stop metabolizing the hatred that has 
become ‘like daily bread’ to her, that she has ‘learned to live upon’ (Lorde 1984a: 
152, 156), because the by-product of that metabolization is rage, rage against her 
‘sisters’.  
How, though, in a context like that described by Lorde, can the abundance of life be 
embraced by someone who is taken by others and who takes themselves to 
incarnate lack (lack of humanity, lack of reason, lack of goodness etc.), someone 
who ‘count[s] for less than nothing’ (Lorde, 1984a: 159)? How is it possible for them 
to practise presumptive generosity towards others when their entire body and being 
is branded as hateful and loathsome both by themselves and by others? Lorde 
appears to concur with Connolly that working on the self is not just possible for those 
like her but also vital for them.15 This, however, has less to do with the articulation of 
an appropriate democratic ethos capable of embracing and facilitating the difference 
constitutive of pluralism (Connolly’s project). It has rather to do with survival – 
psychic, social, personal. The reason for this is because the norms defining Lorde 
are ones that produce her as less-than, as ‘never-good-enough’ (Lorde 1984a: 170). 
When she, as a Black American, expresses emotion she is told: ‘SO WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH YOU, ANYWAY? DON’T BE SO SENSITIVE!’ (Lorde 1984a: 148), 
because within the prevailing racialized world she inhabits, Black subjects are 
posited as over-emotional, even as saturated with emotion.  
The stakes in engaging with her emotions are, therefore, distinct from those typically 
envisaged by Connolly. As she writes:  
in america (sic) white people, by and large, have more time and space to afford 
the luxury of scrutinizing their emotions. Black people in this country have always 
had to attend closely to the hard and continuous work of survival in the most 
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material and immediate planes. But it is a temptation to move from this fact to the 
belief that Black people do not need to examine our feelings; or that they are 
unimportant, since they have so often been used to stereotype and infantilize us; 
or that these feelings are not vital to our survival; or, worse, that there is some 
acquired virtue in not feeling them deeply. That is carrying a timebomb wired to 
our emotions (Lorde 1984a: 171 my emphasis). 
In demanding the right to work on her emotions, Lorde is, in effect, challenging 
particular norms of possibility.  
Let me explain. The issue as I see it concerns what Butler has called ‘liveability’ or, 
more recently, ‘survivability’: that is, ‘the ability to live and breathe and move’ (2004a: 
31). For Butler the ability to live a liveable life is implicitly tied to the norm of 
possibility: the existence, in other words, of norms by which particular persons can be 
recognized as fully human. This is tied in turn to the idea that to be a subject is to be 
intelligible. As Butler writes in The Psychic Life of Power, the subject is ‘the linguistic 
occasion for the individual to achieve and reproduce intelligibility, the linguistic 
occasion of its existence and agency’ (1997: 11). The norms governing intelligibility 
determine who counts – who or ‘what will and will not appear within the domain of the 
social’ (2004a: 42). The survival of any subject depends, therefore, on their 
intelligibility – their approximation to the norm. Those outside or beyond the norm are 
by contrast unintelligible – ‘“impossible”, illegible, unrealizable, unreal and illegitimate’ 
(Butler 1999: viii). They are, in effect, non-existent as subjects.  
It is these norms of possibility that Lorde, in my view, is contesting when she argues 
that Black women must attend to their emotions. This is because Black women’s 
emotions have been construed historically as unimportant, infantile or as excessive. 
Rather than assuming that ethical responsiveness is open to (almost) all as Connolly 
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contends, Lorde demonstrates how racialising norms work restrictively to underwrite 
who is capable of ethical work on themselves. To date, in America, for Lorde this has 
meant white people not Black.  
To be fair, Connolly himself notes that ‘There is no cosmic guarantee that such a 
sensibility must find a foothold in everyone. Having a relatively fortunate childhood 
helps’ (2002a: 197). Those on whom the ‘contingencies of life press ... hard’ 
(Connolly 1999: 201n. 11) may struggle to find space to work on themselves. He 
even goes as far as to note that ‘in a highly stratified society many individuals and 
constituencies are in an unfavourable position to pursue such experimentation’, 
though he then qualifies this by noting ‘[t]his latter fact, however, can easily be 
exaggerated’ (Connolly 1999: 149-50). But he then follows on from this by suggesting 
that because of stratification the onus increases on those ‘who do find themselves in 
a favorable position’ to cultivate a more generous sensibility towards others (Connolly 
1999: 150). Hence his focus on attempting to suggest practices through which ‘We 
pluralists’ (Connolly 1995: xix) can engage with others (a perpetually renewable 
‘them’) in a less stingy and more civil fashion. What he does not do is consider how 
those in a less favourable position, those who are culturally unintelligible and unreal, 
might be able to engage democratically.  
In the final section of this chapter, therefore, I want to reflect on the implications for 
democratic engagement of Connolly’s construction of democracy as an ethos (see 
also Vázquez-Arroyo, 2004). 
Democratic engagement for the unintelligible 
One of the tensions Connolly discusses in his work is that between pluralism and 
pluralization. His attempt to rework the ‘pluralist imagination’ is precisely an attempt 
to explore the tension between these two impulses (1995). He seeks a way to 
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negotiate, that is, the way that the pre-existing ‘culture of pluralism’ acts both as a 
resource for pluralization (the emergence of new modes of difference) and also as a 
limitation on those new drives. So, as we have seen, he advocates an ethos of 
critical responsiveness as a means to remain open – or, perhaps more accurately to 
become open – to these ‘contemporary movements of pluralization’ (Connolly 1995: 
xiv-xv). His focus is thus on how to react positively to the emergence of new political 
movements challenging the status quo. This is where generosity fits. Connolly 
presents it as the most appropriate ethical response to democratic movements; part 
of what he terms ‘agonistic democracy’ (1991). There is certainly much that is 
laudable in this endeavour. I worry, however, that it also risks rendering those such 
as Lorde unintelligible as democratic subjects.  
When generosity is figured as the norm governing democratic engagement then 
those who are ungenerous or resentful are, in effect, posited as outside that norm. As 
such, they are figured as impossible and illegible as democratic subjects. This 
adjudication depends, on course, on the idea that to be an agonistic democrat is to 
embrace an ethos of generosity. To allow that agonistic democracy involves more 
than presumptive generosity, we clearly need to consider how those like Lorde who 
are both resentful and normatively unintelligible might be able to make demands. We 
need to think about how they can act democratically. I want to suggest that one way 
they might do so is by mobilizing their resentment and their unintelligibility, both of 
which involve struggling with the norms that define who counts.  
Democracy is conventionally concerned with how excluded groups have striven to 
transform their lot in life. One way of characterizing this is to conceive of democracy 
in terms of the performative constitution and reconstitution of the demos. The people 
– demos – (the democratic ‘we’) is produced when the excluded demand to be 
acknowledged. They might lay claim to a right, for instance, or an ontology, from 
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which they have been constitutively excluded. As Jacques Rancière formulates, at 
this moment ‘those who have no right to be counted ... make themselves of some 
account’ (1999: 27). It is when the unintelligible, those who fail to figure in the political 
realm as fully human, declare a wrong (to borrow from Rancière) that the people (qua 
democratic subject) are produced. The effect, as Judith Butler observes, is that ‘an 
invocation that has no prior legitimacy can have the effect of challenging existing 
forms of legitimacy’, clearing the way for new, more universal, form (1997:147). 
Arguably, marshalling resentment in the form, say, of anger at injustice or inequality – 
rather than generosity – will be necessary to galvanize such declarations of wrong. 
Moreover, their effect may be to heighten conflict by exposing the contingency of the 
social order – by revealing ‘the presence of two worlds in one’ (Rancière 2001: 21).  
This, I want to suggest, is what happens with Lorde. Her Black body renders her 
unintelligible in a ‘white’ world – this is why she hates and loathes it and other bodies 
like it. Her resentment towards herself and others like her gives rise to her demand to 
have her emotions recognized as human emotions, as legitimate emotions, and thus 
to her challenge to the terms that define her as ‘never-good-enough’. While her aim 
vis-à-vis other Black women might be to seek to transform those emotions into more 
generous ones towards them, there is a second dimension to this process. In seeking 
to love herself and those like her, Lorde is simultaneously contesting the (white) 
norms of intelligibility governing the social world she inhabits. As she comments in 
another essay in Sister Outsider, ‘My anger is a response to racist attitudes and to 
the actions and presumptions that arise out of these attitudes’; it is an ‘anger of 
exclusion, of unquestioned privilege, of racial distortions, of silence, ill-use, 
stereotyping, defensiveness, misnaming, betrayal and co-optation’ (Lorde 1984b: 
124). ‘Focused with precision’, however, anger ‘can become a powerful source of 
energy serving process and change’ (Lorde 1984b: 127, my emphasis). In fact, 
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anger, as Lorde understands it, in declaring a wrong can lead to a fundamental shift 
in ‘those assumptions underlining our lives’ (1984b: 127).16 Through the expression 
of this anger (or resentment, in Connolly’s lexicon), Lorde as a person of no account 
petitions to count and, in so-doing, her act is a democratic act, and potentially a 
radically transformative one at that because it seeks to reconfigure the norms 
defining the terms of liveability, of survivability.  
Conclusion 
Convinced that politics cannot purge itself of affect or emotion or conceive of thinking 
as a purely cognitive process, in this paper I have endeavoured to understand what it 
is that emotions and affects do politically and how they do it. Thinking with Connolly, I 
have suggested they configure bodies and inter-corporeal relations. In the case 
described by Lorde their movement from one sensuous being to another acts as a 
mechanism of subordination. In the circulation of hatred and loathing, as I showed 
earlier, hatred becomes self-hatred and loathing becomes self-loathing. Self-
identification is filtered through the other, layered into the flesh, incarnated in somatic 
dispositions towards others, remembered in conscious thought and at levels 
subsisting below it.  
Where Connolly has sought to show how affect and emotion might be worked on to 
generate the agonistic respect that he believes ought to underpin democratic 
encounters, thinking against him I have sought to demonstrate how they might work 
to support exclusion, to intensify discord between persons, perpetuate the abjection 
of certain bodies, and reinforce prejudice. In short, how they might generate and 
bolster resentment. As such, I have endeavoured to confront Connolly’s stress on 
generosity as central to the cultivation of a democratic ethos with the way that 
negative affects (such as resentment, anger, hatred and loathing) might both block 
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the cultivation of that ethos, as well as fostering democratic struggle. Out of a 
concern that Connolly’s assumption of generosity as the grounds for democratic 
engagement acts as a norm of possibility rendering the ungenerous, the angry, the 
resentful unthinkable as democratic subjects, I have also indicated how resentment 
and other negative affects may drive the unintelligible to make democratic demands. 
In this respect, to view democracy as an ethos practised by the favourably located 
(who respond positively to the struggles of the disenfranchised) is to hazard 
conceiving it far too narrowly. For democracy is also, essentially, ‘the place where the 
people appear’ (Rancière, 1999: 100). 
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1 Unfortunately, I do not have scope in this paper to elaborate how affect and emotion 
might be differentiated. I have tended to use affect here to refer to what Erin Manning 
terms ‘the with-ness of the movement of the world’ (2007: xxi), an initial visceral 
response; while reserving ‘emotion’ to refer to culturally encoded and thus culturally 
variable sentiments. Emotion might be thought of, therefore, as affect canalized 
along certain culturally-defined routes.  
2 In this Connolly goes much further than thinkers such as Michael Walzer, for 
instance, who while also critical of the limits of liberal rationalism and similarly 
prepared to contest the antinomy between ‘passionate intensity’ and ‘principled 
rationality’ that underpins it (Walzer, 2004: 130), fail to explore the mechanisms 
through which affect inflects and modulates thought and vice versa.  
3 Specifically, Connolly notes that his aim vis-à-vis Nietzsche is to ‘turn the 
genealogist of resentment on his head by exploring democratic politics as a medium 
through which to expose resentment and to encourage the struggle against it’ (2002: 
154). Here Connolly is citing his own words in Political Theory and Modernity  (1988: 
175), where he explores Nietzsche’s work at length. 
4 To be clear, I am not saying resentment – or negative affects – will necessarily work 
in this way, just that they might. 
5 For more on the implications of the adoption of Spinozan ‘parallelism’ see Chapter 
Four of Neuroscience (2002a) and Connolly’s essay ‘Experience and Experiment’ 
(2006).  
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6 As Stephen White reminds us, for Nietzsche the overcoming of resentment required 
a distancing from the ordinary and everyday; for Connolly it is the extraordinary in the 
ordinariness of everyday life that interests him (2000: 133).  
7 See Neuropolitics where he discusses how one might shun a friend because ‘a 
racial stereotype clicks in at the possibility of intimacy’ (2002: 35).  
8 See also Ahmed (2004). Ahmed’s focus differs from mine, however, in that she is 
interested in how emotions secure collectives. She thus reads this passage in terms 
of the hate experienced by the white woman and how it functions to align her with 
‘the bodily form of the community’ (that is, a white communal body) against black 
bodies/Black people (Ahmed 2004: 33). What this interpretation occludes, however, 
is Lorde’s focus on intra-racial not inter-racial hatred.  
9 The full quote is: ‘The contagion of affect flows across bodies, as well as across 
conversations, as when anger, revenge, or inspiration is communicated across 
individuals or constituencies by the timbre of our voices, looks, hits, caresses, 
gestures, the bunching of muscles in the neck, and flushes of the skin. Such 
contagion flows through face-to-face meetings, academic classes, family dinners, 
public assemblies, TV speeches, sitcoms, soap operas and films. Affect is infectious 
across layered assemblages, human and otherwise’ (Connolly, 2002: 75). 
10 As she observes later in the essay: ‘If I’d been grown, I’d probably have laughed or 
snarled or been hurt, seen it for what it was. But I am five years old. I see it, I record 
it, I do not name it, so the experience is incomplete. It is not pain; it becomes 
suffering’ (Lorde, 1984a: 172, my emphasis).  
11 The fact that the encounter takes place on a subway train is, I think, significant in 
that it intensifies the affect that is released. In future work, I want to develop the link 
between space and affect further.  
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12 If I had time, I might press into service Judith Butler’s discussion of materialization 
to explain this process; that is, where ‘to be material means to materialize’, and 
‘where the principle of that materialization is precisely what “matters” about that body, 
its very intelligibility’ (1993: 32). Matter and meaning are inextricably linked. To 
materialize is to become meaningful; it is to fit within a particular frame of 
intelligibility, sustained through the reiteration of regulatory norms. The 
materialization of Lorde’s body as a hated-hateful Black body is thus secured through 
normative violence. See Lloyd 2007: 68-77. 
13 To clarify: I am expressly not arguing for a fixed sense of identity (and it seems 
doubtful Lorde is either). Identity, as I have indicated elsewhere is shot through with 
difference, even contradiction (Lloyd 2005). So I am using it here in a non-essentialist 
sense.  
14 Chapter 2 of Neuropolitics is called ‘The Color of Perception’.  
15 Certainly in the last few pages of her essay, Lorde turns her attention to how to 
‘metabolize’ the anger she feels towards others, talking of Black women ‘mothering 
ourselves’: learning to ‘recognize and nurture the creative parts of each other without 
always understanding what will be created’ and ‘laying to rest what is weak, timid, 
and damaged – without despisal’ (Lorde 1984a: 173-4); and noting how learning self-
love must be a prelude to learning how to love another or accepting their love (Lorde 
1984a: 175; see also Connolly 2002b: 176).  
16 It might seem appropriate at this point to press into service a distinction Connolly 
uses in a footnote in The Ethos of Pluralization, where he differentiates between 
ressentiment understood as ‘stored resentment that has poisoned the soul and 
migrated to places where it is hidden and denied’ and resentment, which on this 
occasion at least, refers to the sentiment that ‘might arise when someone has injured 
you unjustly, and you call that person on it, or when you are enraged by lies another 
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tells about you and gets away with it’ (1995, 213-14 n. 17). We might, that is, argue 
that Lorde’s encounters with other Black women express ressentiment while her 
anger at White Americans expresses (righteous) resentment. As the discussion 
above shows, both experiences for Lorde are inextricably interconnected. It is 
unclear to me, therefore, exactly how we would differentiate between them.  
 
